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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of 
proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying 
and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under 
islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be 
implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by 
which the agents may approximate price anticipation is 
considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price 
anticipation is analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the 
resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested. This 
modified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents 
to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. 
Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a  
surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-
objective optimization problem is identified that takes into 
account both the agents’ social welfare as well as the aggregator’s 
revenue from the surcharge. Results of extensive simulations, 
which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported. 
Index Terms—Energy grid; aggregator; agents; trading; 
auction; bid; social welfare. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ETWORK economics has made automated trading feasible, 
where resources are exchanged for money through 
transactions that are done entirely through software agents and 
without the need for any human intervention. It is often the 
case that the agents participating in the trade are involved in 
direct competition with one another, where the objective of 
each agent is to maximize its own payoff. In these situations 
the trade proceeds through an auction mechanism. In single-
sided auctions all agents are either buyers that compete to 
acquire a finite resource, or sellers that compete to sell their 
goods. Double auctions are mechanisms involving both buyers 
and sellers, which simultaneously participate in the bidding 
process and are allocated individual shares of the resource. 
Recent technological advancements in communications and 
renewable energy generation have created much research 
interest in energy auction algorithms [SA+15, PD+15]. In 
these mechanisms, the agents may represent individual 
domestic units within a microgrid, with energy representing 
the resource, and with PV-equipped homes experiencing a 
surplus of energy acting as sellers, and the remaining domestic 
units as buyers [MF+14]. An agent may also represent an 
individual microgrid involving a community of homes that 
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collectively behave as a single unit in the ensuing auction 
[WH15]. A buyer agent’s payoff is typically the difference 
between its utility gained from consuming a certain amount of 
energy and the price that it has to pay in order to procure that 
energy. Likewise a seller agent’s payoff may be formulated as 
the sum of the monetary gain from supplying an amount of 
energy and utility it gains from retaining any surplus energy 
that is not traded.   
The Kelly mechanism refers to a class of auction algorithms 
where agents are allowed to place individual bids on the 
resource, while a separate auctioneer that receives these bids, 
allocates the resource share of each bidding agent in 
proportion to the bid values [KMT98]. With a large number of 
agents, such a proportional allocation mechanism has been 
shown to maximize the aggregate utilities of all agents, the 
latter commonly referred to as the social welfare [MB03, 
JT04, CST15]. Such social welfare maximizing mechanisms 
are efficient auctions. 
Unfortunately, the underlying assumption for proportional 
allocation to be efficient is that the agents be price takers, i.e. 
ones that assume that the bids that they place do not influence 
the market price of the resource. While this is approximately 
true for auctions involving a large number of agents, in 
smaller auctions, agents are aware of their own market power, 
and accordingly, place strategic bids on the resource. Such a 
price anticipatory bidding results in a loss in efficiency where 
the resource allocation of the auction no longer maximizes the 
social welfare. 
It must be noted that there are other efficient auctions that 
explicitly focus on eliciting truthful bidding from the bidders; 
the most significant ones being based on the well-known 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [NR07]. Furthermore, 
auctions designed to maximize the auctioneer’s own earned 
revenue have been proposed in the vast body of literature on 
this subject. However, these mechanisms are not of direct 
relevance in this research, which focuses on efficient double 
auctions along with proportional allocation of electricity 
among its buyers. 
A.   Current Research 
Proportional allocation in single-sided buyers’ auctions has 
been rigorously analyzed [JT04, CSS13]. It is shown that the 
auction is efficient under the assumption of price taking 
buyers. Furthermore, when the agents’ utilities are strictly 
concave functions, the seminal study in [JT04] establishes a 
strong theoretical upper limit on the auction’s loss of 
efficiency at ¼ of the maximum attainable social welfare. 
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More recently, it has been shown that even when buyers are 
price anticipating, proportional allocation allows the 
mechanism to attain the best possible outcome [JT09]. Similar 
theoretical limits have been investigated for a more general 
class of auctions called smooth auctions with proportional 
allocation [ST13]. Theoretical properties of a situation with 
multiple sellers participating in a proportional allocating 
auction, and with inelastic (fixed) demand for the resource has 
been examined [JT11]. 
When the proportional allocation auction takes into account 
the costs of the network’s links through which the resource 
(data) flows, the efficiency is shown to be at least 4√2–5 of the 
social welfare maximum with price anticipating buyers and 
with convex costs [JMT05]. In a separate study it has been 
shown that when the costs are linear, the mechanism’s 
efficiency loss is lower bounded at ⅓ of the maximum value 
[JT06]. Unfortunately, the previous studies are based on the 
assumption that the utility functions’ are convex. Under a 
more general setting where this convexity assumption is not 
true, the mechanism’s efficiency loss no longer enjoys a 
theoretical limit, and could in fact be arbitrarily large 
[CST15]. A few studies have proposed schemes to address an 
auction’s efficiency loss arising from price anticipation. For 
instance an auction mechanism with price differentiation 
where each buyer has a different price, has been proposed 
[YML13]. This study also suggests a feedback control 
mechanism on the price vector that drives the auction to 
converge to the globally optimum social welfare.  
Double auction mechanisms with proportional allocation 
have been studied [KV10]. However, this study considers only 
the case of price takers. The research reported in this paper 
includes a theoretical study on both price anticipating buyers 
and price anticipating sellers participating simultaneously in a 
double auction.  
Research on energy auctions has closely followed the 
theoretical advancement in mechanism design. A large body 
of recent literature on energy auction algorithms model large 
utility company as the sellers [FAA14, JK15, Moh15, 
WLM15, ZX+15]. Many of these studies consider objectives 
and/or constraints that are applicable only to energy trade, 
such as generation scheduling [FAA14, Moh15], economic 
dispatch [ZX+15], and transmission losses [GM15]. Some 
energy auction studies are designed for revenue maximization 
and are not social welfare maximizing (efficient) mechanisms 
[JK15, ZX+15].  
Efficient auctions have begun to gain research attention in 
the present context energy trade. Several such investigations 
do not consider proportionally fair allocation of energy 
[TS+12, TZ+14, WS+14]. One recent study proposes a VCG-
style auction with multiple sellers and a single demand 
response aggregator as the buyer [NAC15]. Another study that 
uses the VCG mechanism reports a double auction [FK+14]. 
The cake-cutting algorithm has been applied to procure energy 
from multiple sellers and for a community of consumers 
acting in tandem as a single buyer [TY+15]. A truthful buyers’ 
auction that makes use of the Arrow-d'Aspremont-Gerard-
Varet mechanism has been suggested [MD+14].  
While some existing approaches as well as this research 
explore Nash equilibrium, where all agents are assumed to act 
simultaneously [LCD15, NAC15, WH15], others use leader-
follower games under Stackelberg equilibrium [TS+12, 
TZ+14, LG+15, WLM15]. This equilibrium concept is 
applicable when the energy market is modeled as an oligopoly 
with only a limited number of suppliers modeled as leader, or 
with the inclusion of an upper level agent such as an 
aggregator [TS+12, TZ+14, LG+15, NAC15]. This is in 
contrast to the present work that treats both buyers and sellers 
with equivalent market parity. 
Many research papers in the existing research on energy 
auctions report only single-sided ones [MD+14, LCD15, 
Moh15, NAC15, TY+15, WH15, WLM15]. However, there 
are some papers that do address some form of double auction 
[DF+14, FK+14, GM15, JK15, LG+15, ZX+15]. One of them 
analyzes the loss of efficiency arising from Stackelberg 
equilibrium where the leading agent enjoys a first-mover’s 
advantage in the underlying game [LG+15]. Another paper on 
double energy auctions, that proposes a primal-dual algorithm, 
is based on the unrealistic assumption that all agents – buyers 
and sellers, act in concert to lower the overall grid cost [15]. 
Yet another such study considers a double auction where the 
energy sellers are utility companies whose goal is revenue 
maximization [GM15]. A preliminary study on double energy 
auction based on the Kelly mechanism has been proposed 
[MF+14]. Another double auction study that does not use 
proportional allocation addresses software issues rather than 
the auction [DF+14]. 
Moreover, none of these single or double energy auctions 
address the issue of price anticipatory behavior of the 
participating agents. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
only one research in the literature on efficient energy auctions 
does examine the adverse effect of price anticipation 
[LCD15]. This study is a single-sided auction with consumers 
of electricity acting as price anticipating buyers. The 
theoretical derivation of the auction’s loss of efficiency 
closely follows that in earlier theoretical studies on single-
sided auctions [JT04, JT11, CSS13]. 
A few of the extant research on energy auctions applies 
some form of price differentiation [FK+14, MF+14, TZ+14, 
GM15, TY+15]. Although this paper does not explicitly do so, 
it is worthwhile to mention that the research reported here can 
be readily extended to address this scenario as theoretical 
research on such mechanisms has been published [YML13]. 
B. Contribution 
This research proposes a double auction mechanism that 
includes one set of agents as buyers, and another set as sellers. 
It also assumes the presence of a separate mediating agent 
called the aggregator whose role, unless indicated otherwise, 
is to (i) receive monetary bids from the buyers and available 
energy for trade from the sellers; (ii) proportionally allocate 
energy to the buyers; (iii) iteratively converge to the market 
clearing price.  
The main contributions of this research are as follows.  
(i) It performs a theoretical analysis of the equilibrium 
conditions arising from price anticipating buyers and sellers, 
thereby extending previous studies on single-sided auctions to 
double auctions. It shows the existence of a unique 
equilibrium for double auctions under price anticipation. 
(ii) It proposes a distributed iterative auction algorithm, and 
suggests a possible realistic scheme through which the selfish 
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Fig.1: Schematic of the network model showing flow of information 
during auction. 
saggregatorvirtual agent
agents may use information from prior iterations to 
approximate price anticipating behavior without any 
knowledge of the other agents. 
(iii) It shows that, unlike in single sided auctions, double 
auctions can readily minimize the loss of efficiency arising 
from price anticipation, suggesting a simple extension of 
proportional allocation in order to approach the minimum. 
(iv) It shows how the aggregator’s own revenue can be 
incorporated within the auction framework, and proposes how 
this can lead to a bi-objective optimization problem where the 
aggregator is no longer strictly selfless by establishing the 
presence of a Pareto front within specific bounds. 
It must be emphasized that although this research considers 
energy as the traded resource, the underlying theoretical 
analysis is directly applicable to other divisible resource 
auctions.  
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. 
Section II presents the framework of the auction. The double 
auction under conditions of price anticipation and price taking 
are outlined in sections III and IV. The proofs of the 
propositions made in both sections have been postponed until 
the appendix. The results obtained from simulations are 
discussed in section V.  Finally, the conclusion of this research 
is derived in section VI. 
II. FRAMEWORK 
A. Network Model 
With energy as the resource involved in the trade, the network 
of agents in our model consists of a set 𝒟 of buyers and 
another set 𝒮 of sellers. Although grid energy auctions 
typically involve the presence of prosumers that buy and sell 
energy, we assume for simplicity that 𝒟 and 𝒮 are disjoint. 
The model also includes a separate entity, 𝒜, the aggregator 
(or auctioneer) that is responsible for communicating with the 
other agents and implementing the auction. Unless otherwise 
indicated the aggregator acts as a selfless agent, requiring no 
separate parametrization of its own, in which case 𝒜 = ∅.  
Each agent, whether a buyer or a seller, has its own utility 
representing the gain (in monetary units) it derives from 
consuming an amount of energy. The utility of a buyer 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 
is denoted as 𝑢𝑖, and that of a seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮, as 𝑣𝑗. As the sellers 
are capable of supplying energy, the model assumes that each 
has a fixed amount of energy  𝑔𝑗, called its generation that is 
available both for its own use and to sell.   
The underlying physical network that implements the 
auction mechanism can be completely defined as the 
following 6-tuple Θ, 
Θ ≜ �𝒟,𝒮,𝑔𝑗 ,𝑢𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗 ,𝒜�.                                       (1) 
The mathematical treatment made throughout the rest of this 
paper is based on the following underlying assumptions. 
(i) The utilities 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗 are continuous, differentiable, 
monotonically increasing and strictly concave functions with 
non-negative arguments. In other words,  𝑢𝑖′, 𝑣𝑗′ > 0 and  𝑢𝑖′′, 𝑣𝑗′′ < 0 when the argument lies within the interval (0,∞). 
(ii) There is at least one buyer and one seller, i.e. 𝒟,𝒮 ≠ ∅, 
and furthermore that at least one buyer 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 that can obtain 
energy from some seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 so that there some trade takes 
place. This assumption can be summarized as follows. 
∃𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮,∋  𝑢𝑖′(0) > 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗�.                            (2) 
B. Auction Process 
The buyers’ and sellers’ bidding processes are implemented as 
separate steps in the auction. Each buyer 𝑖 receives from the 
aggregator its demand 𝑑𝑖, which is the amount of energy that 
it is allocated for use. The buyer responds by communicating 
to the aggregator its bid 𝑏𝑖, which is the amount of money that 
it is willing to pay for it. Separately, each seller 𝑗 receives a 
per unit price 𝑝 of energy, and communicates back to the 
aggregator, its availability 𝑎𝑗 that it is willing to supply.  
 The schematic below (Fig. 1.) shows the layout of the entire 
auction process. The auction proceeds iteratively until 
termination when 𝑝 has converged to the market clearing 
price. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
III. DOUBLE AUCTION UNDER PRICE ANTICIPATION 
A. Aggregator 
It is assumed that there is no energy loss taking place during 
transmission. Thus, with the network operating under isolation  
as is also assumed in this section, the total amount of energy 
that is declared available by the sellers must be equal to the 
total amount demanded by the buyers, so that the following 
energy balance equation holds.   
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖
= � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.                                                             (3) 
 In this section the aggregator is also assumed to be selfless 
and plays no additional role other than that specified earlier 
(𝒜 = ∅), so that the money received as the total buyers’ bids 
is exchanged for the total available energy sold by the sellers. 
Under these circumstances, the per unit price is given by, 
𝑝 = �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
�
−1
� 𝑏𝑖
𝑖
.                                                (4) 
As the auction is based on proportional allocation of 
resources, the energy demand 𝑑𝑖 that each buyer 𝑖 receives 
from the aggregator must be proportional to its bid 𝑏𝑖 so that,  
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑝 , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟.                                                    (5) 
B. Buyer 
Each buyer 𝑖 aims to maximize its payoff from the auction 
mechanism. Noting that it has to pay an amount 𝑏𝑖 in order to 
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receive energy 𝑑𝑖, it places a bid 𝑏𝑖 in accordance with the 
following optimization problem. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑏𝑖: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) − 𝑏𝑖 .                                                                     (6) 
Proposition-1: The optimal bidding strategy of a buyer 
𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 is, 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖)(1 − 𝛽𝑖).                                                 (7) 
Here the quantity 𝛽𝑖 is the market power of buyer 𝑖 described 
later in this section.  
C. Seller 
Each seller 𝑗 declares its availability 𝑎𝑗 at price 𝑝 to the 
aggregator to attain the maximum of its payoff, which is the 
sum of the money that it receives from selling energy as well 
as its own utility from consuming the remaining amount 
𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗 of energy. Noting that its availability cannot exceed its 
generation 𝑔𝑗, its participation in the auction is characterized 
by means of the following optimization problem.   
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑎𝑗: 
𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� + 𝑝𝑎𝑗 .                                                         (8) 
Subject to: 
𝑎𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑗 .                                                                            (9) 
Proposition-2: The optimal bidding strategy of a seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 
is given by the expression below. 
𝑎𝑗 = min�𝑎𝑗∘,𝑔𝑗� ,                                                          (10) 
where 𝑎𝑗∘ is the solution to the equation, 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗
∘� = 𝑝�1 − 𝛼𝑗�.                                            (11) 
The seller’s market power 𝛼𝑗 is described below. 
D. Market Power 
The market power of an agent reflects its ability to influence 
the overall outcome of the auction. When the auction involves 
a large number of agents, an individual agent’s action cannot 
exert a great deal of influence on the outcome; consequently 
the agent’s market power is low. In the limiting case when 
there are an infinite number of agents, the market power 
approaches zero. It is this limiting case that price taking 
conditions serves to approximate. 
 In the present case, the market power 𝛽𝑖 of every buyer 𝑖 
and 𝛼𝑗 that of sellers can be defined through separate 
expressions, given below, 
𝛽𝑖 = �� 𝑏𝑖′
𝑖′
�
−1
𝑏𝑖 ,   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟,                                    (12) 
𝛼𝑗 = �� 𝑎𝑗′
𝑗′
�
−1
𝑎𝑗 ,   ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮.                                   (13) 
 The level of awareness of each buyer or seller about the 
remaining agents can vary from complete unawareness (price 
taking) to full awareness of the others’ bidding strategies (as 
required in Eqns. (12) and (13) above). A realistic scenario 
lies somewhere in between. In such a case, the iterative 
auction would allow the buyer or seller to approximate its 
market power from the information gleaned from previous 
iterations. The expressions below, which are derived from 
Eqns. (7) – (11) can be used as the means by which each buyer 
or seller can obtain such estimates. Superscripts (𝑘 − 1) and (𝑘) have been introduced for clarity to indicate each iteration 
𝑘 and its immediately preceding iteration 𝑘 − 1.   
𝛽𝑖
(𝑘) = 1 − 𝑏𝑖(𝑘−1)
𝑑𝑖
(𝑘−1)𝑢𝑖′�𝑑𝑖(𝑘−1)� ,                                    (14) 
𝛼𝑗
(𝑘) = 1 − 1
𝑝(𝑘−1) �𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗(𝑘−1)� − 𝜌𝑗(𝑘−1)�.      (15) 
Note that neither expression above incorporates quantities 
pertaining to the other agents present in the network.  
The quantity 𝜌𝑗 in Eqn. (15) is a dual variable obtained 
from the constrained optimization problem in Eqns. (8) and 
(9). Further details pertaining to 𝜌𝑗 can be found in the 
appendix. It suffices to mention that 𝜌𝑗 = 0 except in the case 
when the seller declares its entire generation as the 
availability, i.e. 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗. 
At the onset of the auction process (𝑘 = 1), when the agents 
lack prior information, the market powers may be initialized to 
zero so that the agents act as simple price takers. 
E. Distributed Double Auction Algorithm 
Before the iterative bidding process takes place, there are 
several ways by which the aggregator can initialize the auction 
variables 𝑝 and the 𝑑𝑖s that it communicates to the sellers and 
buyers so that they can place their bids. An effective way to 
minimize the number of steps would be to use stored historical 
information from previous rounds. Otherwise the aggregator 
may use heuristic means to do so. In the most simplistic case, 
these variables may be assigned entirely randomly. This 
initialization and the subsequent auction steps are outlined 
below. 
 
Distributed Double Auction Algorithm  
 Initialize 𝑝(0), 𝑑𝑖(0) ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 
 //Buyer 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟:  𝛽𝑖 ← 0 
//Seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮: 𝛼𝑗 ← 0 
 Set 𝑘 ← 1 
 While (termination criterion =  ‘F’) 
   Send 𝑝(𝑘) to sellers 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮  
   //Seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 bid 
   Receive 𝑎𝑗(𝑘) from sellers 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮  
   Send 𝑑𝑖(𝑘) to buyers 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟     //Buyers 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 bid 
   Receive 𝑏𝑖(𝑘) from buyers 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 Increment 𝑘 ← 𝑘 + 1 
Obtain 𝑑𝑖(𝑘) 
   Update 𝑝(𝑘) 
   //Buyers estimate 𝛽𝑖(𝑘) 
//Sellers estimate 𝛼𝑗(𝑘) 
Evaluate termination criterion 
End 
 
F. Equilibrium 
The auction steps described earlier terminates when further 
updates of neither the price 𝑝 nor any of the bids submitted by 
the agents to the aggregator are changed. This is when 
generalized Nash equilibrium [FK10] is established. 
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 In order to characterize the equilibrium conditions under 
price anticipation, the functions 𝜋𝑖(∙) and 𝜋𝑗(∙) are introduced 
below, 
𝜋𝑖(𝑑𝑖) = �1 − �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
�
−1
𝑑𝑖� 𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
+ �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
�
−1
� 𝑢𝑖(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑖
0
,                    (16) 
𝜋𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� �� 𝑎𝑗′
𝑗′
� �� 𝑎𝑗′
𝑗′≠𝑗
�
−1
− �� 𝑎𝑗′
𝑗′≠𝑗
�
−1
� 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑧�𝑑𝑧
𝑎𝑗
0
.  (17) 
The effect of price anticipation can be examined in terms of 
the following constrained optimization problem.  
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗: 
Π�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� = �𝜋𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝜋𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗
.        (18) 
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9) which are restated 
below,  
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖
= � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
,             
𝑎𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑗  .   
Denoting the solutions of the above maximization problem as 
𝑑𝑖
† and 𝑎𝑗
†, the social welfare is 𝑈† ≜ 𝑈�𝑑𝑖
†, 𝑎𝑗†�Θ�. 
Additionally, the maximum social welfare corresponding to 
the efficient solution is denoted as 𝑈∗.  
Proposition-3:  (i) There exists a unique equilibrium of the 
double auction where the demand 𝑑𝑖 of each buyer 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 and 
availability 𝑎𝑗 of each seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 is the solution to the 
optimization problem defined in Eqn. (18) with Eqns. (3) and 
(9) as constraints.  
(ii) The social welfare attained under price anticipation is no 
greater than that attainable under price taking, i.e., 
𝑈† ≤ 𝑈∗.                                                                          (19) 
The above statement implies that there is a loss of efficiency 
due to price anticipation. 
IV. DOUBLE AUCTION UNDER PRICE TAKING 
A. Efficient Solution 
The efficient solution can be obtained from the following 
constrained optimization problem. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗: 
𝑈�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� = �𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗
.         (20) 
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9) which are restated 
below. 
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖
= � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.             
𝑎𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑗 ,    ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮.   
For the sake of convenience the buyer 𝑖’s bidding strategy, 
which is that in Eqn. (7) with 𝛽𝑖 = 0, is provided below.  
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖).                                                              (21) 
The seller 𝑗’s strategy is determined according to Eqns. (10) 
and (11) where 𝛼𝑗 = 0, and given below, 
𝑎𝑗 = min�𝑎𝑗∘,𝑔𝑗� ,                                                          (22) 
where 𝑎𝑗∘ is the solution to the equation, 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗
∘� = 𝑝.                                                            (23) 
Proposition-4: Under the assumption that the buyers and 
sellers are price takers, the following statements are true for 
the double auction.  
(i) The buyer and seller strategies are defined according to 
Eqns. (21), (22) and (23). 
(ii) The equilibrium demand 𝑑𝑖∗ of each buyer 𝑖 and 
availability 𝑎𝑗∗ of each seller 𝑗 after the termination of the 
auction are unique solutions of Eqns. (3), (9) and (20).  
(iii) There is no loss in efficiency, i.e.  
𝑈∗ ≜ 𝑈�𝑑𝑖
∗, 𝑎𝑗∗�Θ� = max
𝑑𝑖,𝑎𝑗 𝑈�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� .                    (24) 
Thus the unique equilibrium of the double auction is also the 
efficient solution.  
The market price at equilibrium from the auction is denoted 
as 𝑝∗. At equilibrium, the derivative of the utility function 
(also called marginal utility) of each buyer and that of each 
seller that is not trading its entire generation 𝑔𝑗 is equal to the 
market price; and for traders that trade all of it, more than the 
price. Mathematically, 
�
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖∗) = 𝑝∗;                                     
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗
∗� = 𝑝∗ when 𝑎𝑗∗ < 𝑔𝑗;
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗
∗� > 𝑝∗ when 𝑎𝑗∗ = 𝑔𝑗;                              (25) 
The equilibrium can be understood readily graphically as 
shown in Fig. 2(a). Here, we define the aggregate demand 
function 𝐷(𝑝) as the total amount of energy delivered to the 
buyers as a function of the market price 𝑝. Likewise, we 
define the availability function 𝐴(𝑝) as the total availability 
declared by the suppliers as a function of 𝑝. Thus, 
𝐷(𝑝) = �𝑑𝑖
𝑖
,                                                            (26) 
𝐴(𝑝) = � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.                                                            (27) 
Proposition-5: Under the assumption of price taking, the 
following statements are true for the double auction.  
 (i) The availability function 𝐴(𝑝) is zero when 𝑝 ≤min𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗�, monotonically increasing with price  𝑝 in the 
interval 𝑝 ∈ �min𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗� , max𝑗 𝑣𝑗′(0)� and constant when 
𝑝 ≥ max𝑗 𝑣𝑗′(0). In other words, 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝐴(𝑝) = 0,            𝑝 ≤ min𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗� ;                         
𝐴(𝑝) mon.  inc. , min
𝑗
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗� < 𝑝 < max
𝑗
𝑣𝑗
′(0) ;
𝐴(𝑝) constant,   𝑝 ≥ max
𝑗
𝑣𝑗
′(0).                             (28) 
(ii) The demand function 𝐷(𝑝) is monotonically decreasing 
with price 𝑝 in the interval 𝑝 ∈ (0, max𝑖 𝑢𝑖′(0)) and zero when 
𝑝 ≥ max𝑖 𝑢𝑖′(0). 
�
𝐷(𝑝) mon. dec. , 𝑝 < max
𝑖
𝑢𝑖
′(0) ,
𝐷(𝑝) = 0,           𝑝 ≥ max
𝑖
𝑢𝑖
′(0) .                              (29) 
(iii) At the unique equilibrium price 𝑝∗, 𝐴(𝑝∗) =  𝐷(𝑝∗).  
B. Virtual Bidding  
In general, the loss of efficiency, when 𝑑𝑖 is the demand of 
each buyer 𝑖, and 𝑎𝑗, the allocation of each seller 𝑗, can be 
expressed as follows. 
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(a)
(b)
𝐿Θ(𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗) = 𝑈�𝑑𝑖∗, 𝑎𝑗∗�Θ� − 𝑈�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ�𝑈�𝑑𝑖∗, 𝑎𝑗∗�Θ� .                (30) 
The loss that takes place when the agents participate in the 
auction as price anticipators is 𝐿Θ(𝑑𝑖†, 𝑎𝑗†). This section shows 
how the basic proportional allocation double auction 
mechanism can be extended to mitigate the loss of efficiency.  
In order to minimize the loss 𝐿Θ, a virtual agent can be 
introduced to the network defined earlier in Eqn. (1). The 
virtual agent, which is indexed with the subscript ‘0’, 
participates in the auction simultaneously as a buyer and a 
seller with arbitrarily large availability 𝑎0. As the virtual agent 
is incorporated within the aggregator, we let 𝒜 = {𝑎0}. 
 Since the virtual agent does not have its own generation, it 
buys back the amount of energy 𝑎0 declared as its availability 
at the market price defined in Eqn. (4), so that, 
𝑏0 = 𝑝𝑎0.                                                                      (31) 
Proposition-6: As the virtual agent’s availability 𝑎0 
increases, the loss in efficiency 𝐿Θ from price anticipation 
decreases. In the limiting case, lim
𝑎0→∞
𝐿Θ(𝑑𝑖†, 𝑎𝑗†) = 0.                                              (32) 
Since the inclusion of virtual bidding allows the auction to 
behave like a price taking mechanism, for the remainder of 
this section we assume that the buyers and sellers behave as 
price takers. 
C. Surcharge  
We now consider the situation where the aggregator, 𝒜, is no 
longer a strictly selfless enabler in the auction process but also 
has its own incentive to implement the mechanism by levying 
a surcharge price 𝑝𝑠 per unit of energy traded. Thus in the 
model in Eqn. (1) the aggregator now includes the surcharge, 
which we indicate by letting it be given by 𝒜 = {𝑎0 → ∞, 𝑝𝑠}. 
The total revenue earned by the aggregator from the auction 
with the introduction of surcharge is given by, 
𝑅 = 𝑝𝑠� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.                                                             (33) 
The expression for the price in Eqn. (4) is modified to account 
for the surcharge as follows, 
�𝑏𝑖
𝑖
= (𝑝 + 𝑝𝑠)� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.                                            (34) 
With proportional allocation, the demand 𝑑𝑖 that each buyer 𝑖 
receives is given by the following expression that replaces the 
earlier Eqn. (5), 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝 .                                                                 (35) 
Fig. 2(b) illustrates the effect of the surcharge. Eqn. (35) 
shows that the buyers purchase energy at an effective per unit 
price of 𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝 which is higher than 𝑝 that the sellers receive 
per unit of energy traded. The volume of energy traded is 
equal to 𝐷(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝) = 𝐴(𝑝), which is lower than 𝐴(𝑝∗) = 𝐷(𝑝∗). 
 We show that the price taking auction is the solution to the 
following constrained optimization problem. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗: 
Ω�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� = �𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗
     −𝑝𝑠� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
.                                               (36) 
Subject to constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9), 
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖
= � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
,             
𝑎𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑗 .   
Proposition-7: Under the assumption of price taking, the 
following statements are true with surcharge price 𝑝𝑠 > 0. 
(i) The buyer and seller strategies are defined according to 
Eqns. (21), (22) and (23). 
(ii) The equilibrium demand 𝑑𝑖 of each buyer 𝑖 and 
availability 𝑎𝑗 of each seller 𝑗 of the auction are unique 
solutions of Eqns. (3), (9) and (36).  
(iii) There exists a Pareto front where any increase in 
revenue 𝑅 is associated with a simultaneous decrease in the 
social welfare in Eqn. (20). 
(iv) There exists an optimal surcharge 𝑝𝑠OPT that maximizes 
the aggregator 𝒜’s revenue 𝑅.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. RESULTS 
A. Setup 
In order to compliment the theoretical considerations in the 
earlier sections, several sets of simulations were carried out. A 
total of five scenarios were considered, where the number of 
buyers and sellers were |𝒟| = 2, |𝒮| = 3, |𝒟| = 2, |𝒮| = 6, |𝒟| = 2, |𝒮| = 10, |𝒟| = 3, |𝒮| = 2 and |𝒟| = 4, |𝒮| = 4. In 
order to analyze the effect of price anticipation, the total 
number of agents were made relatively small in comparison to 
other simulation studies. Moreover, the first three scenarios 
Fig.2: Plots of the 𝐴(𝑝) and 𝐷(𝑝) as functions of 𝑝. In the x-
axis, 𝑙 = 𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗�, 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑗 𝑣𝑗′(0), and 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑖 𝑢𝑖′(0).              
(a) Equilibrium conditions under price taking. (b) The addition 
of surcharge price with revenue 𝑅 being the area shaded in grey.       
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Fig.5: The Pareto front of the revenue 𝑅 and social welfare 𝑈 
with varying surcharge price 𝑝𝑠, for each scenario. 
contain only 2 sellers. This reflects the situation is a realistic 
microgrid, where the number of PV-equipped units is usually 
lower than the number of those without it. The fourth and fifth 
scenarios were added to explore the performance of the double 
auction under other potential situations. 
 The utilities of the buyers and sellers assumed to follow 
logarithmic saturation curves according to,  
𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖 log(𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 1),                                          (42) 
and, 
𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑚𝑗 log(𝑦𝑗(𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗) + 1).                   (43) 
The quantities 𝑚𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑚𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 were different for each agent, 
and were generated randomly from a uniform distribution 
centered at unity. The generations, 𝑔𝑗, for the sellers were also 
drawn in at random, uniformly in the interval [𝑔min,𝑔max]. 
B. Price Anticipation 
The first set of simulations was performed to examine the 
effect of price anticipation of the buyers and sellers upon the 
double auction. The results of this study are shown in Fig. 3. It 
can be seen that in each case there is a reduction in the social 
welfare due to price anticipation. More detailed analysis 
shows that when considered separately, while the social 
welfare of the buyers reduces due to price anticipation, the 
social welfare of the sellers is increased. This is because 
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that price anticipation (𝛽𝑖 ,𝛼𝑗 >0) causes the values of  𝑑𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗 to be lower than with price 
taking (𝛽𝑖 ,𝛼𝑗 = 0). Consequently, the volume of energy being 
traded is also less so that the surplus amount of energy 𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗 
remaining with each seller 𝑗 is higher, which also increases its 
utility, 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�.  
Although, due to price anticipation, the social welfare in a 
double auction is lower than its optimal value, the utilities of 
the sellers change in the opposite direction. Thus an 
observation made from this study is that the effect of price 
anticipatory agents in double-auctions is less severe in 
comparison to single-sided auctions.  
C. Virtual Bidding 
The effect of virtual bidding was investigated through a 
second set of simulations. The results of these simulations are 
provided in Fig. 4, separately for each of the five scenarios.  
 It can be seen that the loss in efficiency 𝐿Θ approaches zero 
as 𝑎0 increases towards 𝑎0 → ∞. This observation holds true 
for each of the five scenarios that were simulated, and is 
consistent with Proposition-6. 
D. Surcharge 
In order to examine the role of the surcharge price 𝑝𝑠 on the 
double auction, a set of simulations were carried out for each 
of the five scenarios described earlier. As price taking 
conditions are assumed, the agents’ market powers were 
always set at 𝛽𝑖 = 0,𝛼𝑗 = 0, throughout the iterative 
mechanism.  
The auction was simulated until equilibrium for different 
values of the surcharge price 𝑝𝑠.  Fig. 5 shows the Pareto front 
discussed in the claim (iii) in Proposition-7. In each scenario, 
the extreme left end points of the fronts correspond to 𝑝𝑠 = 0 
so that the social welfare is maximum 𝑈 = 𝑈∗, while the 
aggregator’s revenue 𝑅 = 0. 
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Fig.6: Aggregator’s revenue 𝑅 as a function of surcharge price 𝑝𝑠, 
for each scenario. 
As 𝑝𝑠 progressively increases until 𝑝𝑠OPT, so does 𝑅, while 
𝑈 decreases. The right ends of the Pareto fronts correspond to 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠OPT. When 𝑝𝑠 exceeds 𝑝𝑠OPT, both 𝑈 and 𝑅 decrease, 
which is not shown in Fig. 5. 
 Fig. 6 shows how the aggregator’s revenue 𝑅 varies with 
surcharge 𝑝𝑠. In each scenario, 𝑅 increases with 𝑝𝑠 until it 
reaches its maximum when the surcharge is 𝑝𝑠OPT. In all but 
one scenario, the revenue 𝑅 can be seen to decrease beyond its 
corresponding maximum. These results are consistent with 
claim (iv) of Proposition-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distributed double auction algorithm in Section-III can be 
implemented readily by the aggregator, even in the presence 
of a virtual agent or with surcharge pricing. The algorithm can 
optionally consider price-anticipatory agents. A possible 
method by which real world agents may use information 
gathered from earlier iteration to imitate price anticipation has 
been suggested.   
It is shown that with price anticipating agents, the double 
auction’s equilibrium coincides with that of a constrained 
optimization problem whose objective function Π is different 
from the social welfare function 𝑈, resulting in a loss of 
efficiency. It is shown that when the aggregator incorporates a 
virtual agent that is simultaneously both a buyer and a seller, 
can minimize the loss of efficiency, so that the double auction 
can reach the efficient equilibrium. 
A generalized auction scenario where the aggregator 
receives a surcharge price is investigated where in the limiting 
case, the aggregator may act as a selfish agent trying to 
maximize its revenue 𝑅 from the auction. With the social 
welfare 𝑈 and revenue 𝑅 as independent objectives, a bi-
objective framework for the double auction mechanism is 
suggested.  
 The theoretical analysis has been supplemented by several 
simulations. The results of the simulations are in complete 
agreement with the theory. 
 
VII. APPENDIX 
Let, 
𝐴 = � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
. 
𝐵 = �𝑏𝑖𝑁𝐵
𝑖=1
.   
 
Proof of Proposition-1: The stationary condition of Eqn. (6) is 
obtained by differentiation with respect to the bid 𝑏𝑖 as shown 
below. 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖)∂𝑑𝑖∂𝑏𝑖 = 1. 
As buyer 𝑖 is price anticipating, 𝑑𝑖 is dependent on 𝑏𝑖 through 
the price 𝑝. Hence replacing ∂𝑑𝑖
∂𝑏𝑖
 appropriately using Eqn. (5) 
and applying the chain rule we get,  
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖) 1𝑝 �1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑝 ∂𝑝∂𝑏𝑖� = 1.                                        (A1) 
Using Eqn. (4) the above equality yields, 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖) �1 − 𝑏𝑖𝐵� = 𝑝.                                                  (A2) 
Whence from Eqn. (12), 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖)(1 − 𝛽𝑖) = 𝑝.                                                    (A3) 
Proposition-1 follows directly from the above and Eqn. (5). 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-2: Introducing the dual variable 𝜌𝑗, the 
Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqns. (8) and (9) is, 
ℒ𝑆�𝑎𝑗 ,𝜌𝑗� = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� + 𝑝𝑎𝑗  + 𝜌𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗�.  
This yields the following KKT conditions. 
𝜌𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗� = 0,                                                         (A4) 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑝 + 𝑎𝑗 ∂𝑝∂𝑎𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 .                               (A5) 
Replacing ∂𝑝
∂𝑎𝑗
 above appropriately using Eqn. (4), 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑝�1 − 𝛼𝑗� + 𝜌𝑗 .                               (A6) 
The quantity 𝛼𝑗 is defined in Eqn. (13). When 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗, Eqn. 
(A4) shows that 𝜌𝑗 = 0. The corresponding availability in 
Eqn. (A6) is equal to 𝑎𝑗∘ that solves Eqn. (11). The other 
situation in (A4) arises when 𝜌𝑗 < 0, in which case the entire 
generated energy is declared available, i.e. 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗 . 
We can rewrite the above observations more concisely as, 
�
𝜌𝑗 = 0, 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗;
𝜌𝑗 < 0, 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗 .                                               (A7) 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-3: Observe that, using Eqns. (3), (12) and 
(13), the derivatives of the functions defined earlier in Eqns. 
(16) and (17) are, 
∂
∂𝑑𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖),                                             (A8) 
∂
∂𝑎𝑗
𝜋𝑗 = − 11 − 𝛼𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�.                                  (A9) 
From Eqn. (12) since 𝛽𝑖 > 0, whenever 𝑑𝑖 > 0, ∂∂𝑑𝑖 𝜋𝑖 > 0 in 
Eqn. (A8). The factor (1 − 𝛽𝑖) in Eqn. (A8) is also strictly 
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decreasing in 𝑏𝑖 and hence 𝑑𝑖. Thus 
∂
∂𝑑𝑖
𝜋𝑖 is also 
monotonically decreasing. Therefore 𝜋𝑖 is a strictly concave 
function. In a similar manner, from Eqn. (13) it is clear that 
𝛼𝑗 < 1 as long as 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑗, so that ∂∂𝑎𝑗 𝜋𝑗 < 0 in Eqn. 
(A9). Besides as 1
1−𝛼𝑗
 is strictly increasing, the product is 
monotonically decreasing. Therefore 𝜋𝑗 is strictly concave. 
Thus there is a unique maximum of Π�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� as defined in 
Eqn. (18). 
The Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqn. (18), with 
Eqns. (3) and (9) acting as constraints, is given by, 
ℒ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝜆𝑗, 𝜇� = �𝜋𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝜋𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗+ � 𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗�
𝑗+ 𝜇 �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
−� 𝑑𝑖
𝑖
� .                           (A10) 
The quantities 𝜇 and 𝜆𝑗 above are the dual variables 
introduced by the constraints in Eqns. (3) and (9). The primal 
conditions from Eqns. (3) and (9) must be satisfied. 
Furthermore, complementary slackness conditions yield, 
𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗� = 0.                                                       (A11) 
From Eqns. (A8) and (A9), the stationary conditions of Eqn. 
(A10) must satisfy, (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖) = 𝜇,                                                 (A12) 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = �1 − 𝛼𝑗��𝜆𝑗 + 𝜇�.                         (A13) 
From Eqns. (A3) and (A12) it is observed that 𝜇 = 𝑝. Using 
Eqn. (5) it is seen that the buyer’s bidding strategy defined in 
Eqn. (7) is satisfied. 
When 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗, Eqn. (A11) shows that 𝜆𝑗 = 0. Replacing 𝜆𝑗 
and  𝜇 with 0 and 𝑝, Eqn. (11) is satisfied. On the other hand, 
when 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗, 𝜆𝑗 is set to an appropriate value. From the 
concavity assumption, 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� < 𝑝�1 − 𝛼𝑗� so that 
𝜆𝑗 < 0. We summarize these observations as follows. 
�
𝑝 = 𝜇;                           
𝜆𝑗 < 0 when 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗;
𝜆𝑗 = 0 when 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗 .                                          (A14) 
From the above considerations, it is seen that in both cases 
Eqn. (A13) satisfies the seller’s bidding strategy in Eqn. (10). 
Eqn. (19) is trivially true since 𝑈∗ which is defined in Eqn. 
(24) is the maximum social welfare. 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-4: First, note that since the utilities are 
strictly concave, there is a unique optimum of the optimization 
problem defined in Eqn. (20) with constraints defined in Eqns. 
(3) and (9). The Lagrangian is, 
ℒ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝜆𝑗, 𝜇� = �𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗+ � 𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗�
𝑗+ 𝜇 �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
−� 𝑑𝑖
𝑖
� .                           (A15) 
The stationary conditions satisfy, 
𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗� = 0,                                                       (A16) 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖) = 𝜇,                                                                 (A17) 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜇.                                             (A18) 
Comparing Eqn. (A17) with Eqn. (21), under proportional 
allocation in Eqn. (5), we see that 𝜇 = 𝑝. Replacing ∂𝑝
∂𝑎𝑗
 in 
Eqn. (A5) with zero, the seller’s stationary conditions satisfy 
(A4) and the following, 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑝 + 𝜌𝑗 .                                             (A19) 
From Eqns. (A17), (A18) and (A19),  
�
𝑝 = 𝜇;                           
𝜆𝑗 < 0 when 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗;
𝜆𝑗 = 0 when 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗 .                                          (A20) 
Statements (i) and (ii) follow from the above. Since the social 
welfare U�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗�Θ� is maximized, statement (iii) holds. 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-5: For each seller 𝑗, from Eqn. (A7) it is 
seen that 𝜌𝑗 = 0 when 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗. Also 𝛼𝑗 = 0 under price 
taking. Hence from Eqn. (A6), 
𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗 − 𝑣𝑗′−1(𝑝).                                                   (A21) 
Since 𝑣𝑗′′ > 0, 𝑎𝑗 is strictly increasing in the interval 𝑝 ∈
�𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗�, 𝑣𝑗′(0)�. Moreover as 𝑎𝑗 ∈ [0,𝑔𝑗] and as Eqn. (26) 
shows, 𝐴(𝑝) is the sum of all 𝑎𝑗s, statement (i) follows. 
For each buyer 𝑖, from Eqn. (A3), with 𝛽𝑖 = 0, 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖′−1(𝑝).                                                               (A22) 
Since 𝑢𝑖′′ > 0, 𝑑𝑖 is strictly decreasing with 𝑝 in the interval 
𝑝 ∈ �0,𝑢𝑖′(0)�. Moreover 𝑑𝑖 = 0 when 𝑝 ≥ 𝑢𝑖′(0). Hence 
statement (ii) follows directly from Eqn. (23) where 𝐷(𝑝) is 
expressed as the sum of all 𝑑𝑖s.  
 From Eqn. (2), there is a non-empty interval 𝑝 ∈
�min𝑗 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗� , max�max𝑖 𝑢𝑖′(0) , max𝑗 𝑣𝑗′(0)��  within which 
𝐷(𝑝) is monotonically decreasing or zero and 𝐴(𝑝) is 
monotonically increasing or fixed at a positive value. Thus 
there is a unique 𝑝∗ such that 𝐴(𝑝∗) =  𝐷(𝑝∗). 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-6: Since from Eqn. (31) 𝑏0 = 𝑝𝑎0, the 
expression for the price in Eqn. (4) is replaced with, 
𝑝 = �𝑎0 + � 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
�
−1
�𝑏0 + �𝑏𝑖
𝑖
� .                   (A23) 
With the addition of virtual bidding, Eqns. (12) and (13) 
pertaining to market powers are rewritten as, 
𝛽𝑖 = �𝑏0 + � 𝑏𝑖′
𝑖′
�
−1
𝑏𝑖 ,   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟,                        (A24) 
𝛼𝑗 = �𝑎0 + � 𝑎𝑗′
𝑗′
�
−1
𝑎𝑗 ,   ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮.                      (A25) 
Eqns. (A24) and (A25) show that both 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛼𝑗 
monotonically decrease with increasing 𝑎0. From Eqns. (A8) 
and (A9) it follows that ∂
∂𝑑𝑖
𝜋𝑖 and 
∂
∂𝑎𝑗
𝜋𝑗 monotonically 
approach 𝑢𝑖′ and 𝑣𝑗′. As we have shown that 𝜋𝑖 and 𝜋𝑗 are 
strictly concave, it follows that they increase monotonically 
with increasing values of 𝑎0; whence from Eqn. (18), 𝑈† also 
increases monotonically. In the limiting case, lim𝑏0→∞ 𝛽𝑖 = 0, 
and lim𝑎0→∞ 𝛼𝑗 = 0; whereupon it follows that  
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lim𝑎0→∞ 𝑈† = 𝑈∗. Simultaneously, from Eqn. (30), the loss of 
efficiency decreases monotonically towards zero. This shows 
that inserting the virtual bidder into the auction allows the 
auction to simulate price-taking.  
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition-7: The equilibrium of the optimization 
problem defined in Eqn. (36) is unique because the addition of 
the linear term involving 𝑝𝑠 does not alter the concavity 
property.   
The Lagrangian of the problem defined in Eqn. (36), with 
Eqns. (3) and (9) as constraints, is given by, 
ℒ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝜆𝑗 , 𝜇� = �𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖
+ � 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗
− 𝑝𝑠� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
 + � 𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗�
𝑗+ 𝜇 �� 𝑎𝑗
𝑗
−� 𝑑𝑖
𝑖
� .                           (A26) 
The stationary conditions satisfy, 
𝜆𝑗�𝑎𝑗 − 𝑔𝑗� = 0,                                                       (A27) 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖) = 𝜇 + 𝑝𝑠,                                                       (A28) 
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜇.                                             (A29) 
Analogous to the reasoning provided in the proof of 
Proposition-4, it can be established that at equilibrium we 
must have,  
�
𝑝 = 𝜇;                           
𝜆𝑗 < 0 when 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗;
𝜆𝑗 = 0 when 𝑎𝑗 < 𝑔𝑗 .                                          (A30) 
This establishes the statements (i) and (ii). 
From Eqn. (33), when 𝑝𝑠 = 0, the revenue 𝑅 = 0. 
However, from the assumption in Eqn. (2), the aggregate 
availability 𝐴 is nonzero. Thus the social welfare is at the 
unique maximum 𝑈∗ > 0. Increasing 𝑝𝑠 monotonically 
increases the revenue 𝑅 and also monotonically decreases the 
social welfare 𝑈. This shows the existence of a non-singleton 
Pareto front as claimed in (iii). 
 It can be readily inferred from Fig. 2(b) that for a 
sufficiently large value of 𝑝𝑠, the aggregate demand is zero, so 
that the volume of energy traded is zero and 𝑅 = 0. In fact the 
upper limit of 𝑝𝑠 is defined as, 
𝑝𝑠 < max
𝑖
𝑢𝑖
′(0) − min
𝑗
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗� .                               (A31) 
It is concluded that there is an optimal 𝑝𝑠 that maximizes the 
aggregator’s revenue 𝑅  verifying the claim in statement (iv). 
■ 
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